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Spatial Externalities in Agriculture: 
Empirical Analysis, Statistical Identification, and Policy Implications  
 
Abstract: Spatial externalities can affect economic welfare and landscape pattern by linking 
farm returns on adjoining parcels of land. While policy can be informed by research that 
documents spatial externalities, statistically quantifying the presence of externalities from 
landscape pattern is insufficient for policy guidance unless the underlying cause of the 
externality can be identified as positive or negative. This article provides a springboard for 
empirical research by examining the underlying structure, social-environmental interactions, and 
statistical identification strategies for the analysis and quantification of agricultural spatial 
externalities that are derived from observations of landscape change.  The potential for original 
policy treatments of agricultural spatial externalities in development and environment outcomes 
are highlighted. 
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Spatial Externalities in Agriculture: 
Empirical Analysis, Statistical Identification, and Policy Implications  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
  Spatial externalities in agriculture have the potential to shape the land use decisions of 
farmers in developing and developed countries and in the process affect both local economic 
welfare and broader environmental sustainability (Parker and Munroe 2007; Belcher et al. 2005). 
Organic farming, cultivation of high-agrobiodiversity crops, co-existence of genetically and non-
genetically modified crops, and management of invasive species in shifting cultivation systems 
offer examples of agricultural land uses where spatial externalities emanating from neighboring 
or proximate farms can shape farmer returns and hence land use decisions.  Because agricultural 
landscapes typically involve multiple agents, transactions costs are likely to impede farmer-to-
farmer coordination.  Therefore, decentralized Coasian solutions may be hard to construct even 
to address the local externality concerns of farmer returns under alternate land use choices. To 
the extent that parcel-level land-use decisions aggregate to influence landscape-scale processes, 
spatial externalities can also influence public goods at the regional scale (e.g. sediment flows in 
watersheds) and the global scale (e.g. crop genetic diversity).  Therefore, the potential lack of a 
decentralized Coasian solution to micro-scale spatial externalities may have local, regional, and 
global policy implications.  
Effective policy requires an understanding of the types of externalities, the effects on land 
use decisions, and the impacts of these decisions on welfare in economic development and 
environmental outcomes.  Policy instruments, in this context, can range from the work by local 
institutions and organizations to shape farmer interactions to the international agreements in 
support of economically and ecologically important activities through conventional policy 
instruments, such as subsidies or taxes.  As illustrated below, the proper scope and combinations   5
of policy depends on the particulars of the spatial externality and welfare concerns associated 
with the outcomes. 
The primary goal of this article is to introduce and develop a new perspective into 
development and environment policy discussions and analyses: namely, the combined 
environmental and economic consequences of the spatial organization of agriculture that can 
result from a range of environmental and social externalities across parcels and farms.  We 
examine these spatial dynamics of environment-agriculture ties through the combination of 
general discussion (Section 1), brief descriptions of four empirical cases, two from the Andean 
countries (Peru and Bolivia) and two from the U.S. (Section 2), a selective review of the relevant 
environmental, agricultural, and economic literatures on spatial interactions (Section 3), and the 
development of an analytical model (Section 4).  The model is applied to the four case studies 
(Section 5) in order to show how the analytical structure provides strategies for identifying the 
presence and extent of these externalities.  Section 6 considers the policy implications of spatial 
externalities in agriculture for both development and environment objectives. Section 7 
summarizes our findings with an eye toward productive avenues for research on spatial 
externalities in agriculture. 
The article is based on the idea of “spatial externalities” as a micro-level interaction that 
can result in the clustering of agricultural land use choices.  The empirical case studies and the 
economic modeling serve to illustrate how environmental and social spatial externalities – either 
separately or in combination – can affect the return stream of farm income on adjoining 
individual parcels in either a positive or negative fashion and hence exert important influences on 
farmers’ production choices.   Environmental spatial externalities emerge because of the 
movements of such materials as water, soil, plant, pest, pollen, and contaminants between farms,   6
and can vary in intensity and even direction depending on the biophysical landscape, local 
infrastructure, and production choices of neighboring farmers.  For example, soil erosion is either 
a problem or a source of deposition for a downstream neighbor.  Regardless, if environmental 
externalities from one farm create a sufficient increase or decrease in the returns to different crop 
choices or technological practices on neighboring farms, these externalities may then alter the 
choice of the neighbor, and thus could lead to the clustering of agricultural activities. 
  Social spatial externalities also give rise to changes in the return structure on neighboring 
farms, and result from processes related to changes in information flows, transaction costs, fixed 
costs, infrastructure, and so forth.  A positive social-spatial externality that has been a major 
focus of recent work in technology adoption studies is the potential spillover from one farmer’s 
learning about a new technology to his or her neighbors (e.g., Conley and Udry, 2005).  
Information is a positive social externality, in part because of its non-excludable feature, that 
could induce agricultural clustering with neighboring farmers adopting the same crop or 
technology based on a shared but not necessarily symmetric or coordinated learning process.  An 
example of a negative social externality is the crop damage resulting from incursion of a 
neighbor’s livestock in regions where grazing is common and property rights are not well 
defined or readily defended.  Obviously, environmental and social externalities can be present 
together in some instances. In such cases they could exert positive or negative effects on returns 
to land uses depending on the environmental and social contexts. 
Since our study is focused on spatial dynamics it is important to note at the outset that a 
variety of scales often come into play in both environmental spatial externalities as well as social 
spatial externalities.  The model in this article focuses on the scale of the single field that is 
managed by an individual farm household (defined here as the “micro-scale”). Our examination   7
treats the environmental and social externalities that spillover from the single field to adjoining 
parcels. As described below, this “micro-scale” of spatial externalities can create discernable 
clusters of certain field- and farm-types (“patches”). Worth noting also is that the micro-scale 
spatial externalities at the inter-field level that we focus on are also ones that can play a role in 
patterning over larger areas, such as community- and region-level effects. These larger area 
outcomes are many times of major interest for the combined reasons of environmental 
management and economic development impacts (Smithers et al., 2005). 
  Despite the recent advances in spatial economics (and spatial econometrics), very little 
attention has been given to the problem of quantifying the agricultural spatial externalities that 
might affect farmer land use decisions and resulting welfare impacts.  Ultimately, the primary 
challenge to research and – if needed - policy is empirical analysis and statistical identification of 
the presence, extent, and direction of agricultural spatial externalities.  Since information 
regarding return possibilities on individual parcels of land (in actual and counterfactual 
situations) is typically incomplete, we propose using spatial land use information as an 
alternative source for the analysis and quantification of spatial externalities.  Geospatially 
referenced land use information is increasingly available in a variety of types and scales---we 
focus on GIS (Geographic Information Systems) data at the scale of individual farm parcels. 
However, using spatial land-use data for this purpose requires strategies for identifying 
environmental and social externalities with the help of structural models, temporal data, and 
empirical landscape-based experiments.  Our hope is that this paper provides a springboard for 
empirical research on spatial externalities in different agricultural contexts by examining micro-
level structure and strategies for empirical analysis and statistical identification.   8
2. FOUR CASES OF SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE 
  For two cases from the Andes and two from the United States, this section offers an 
analysis of the basic logic of spatial externalities that appear to be key factors in farmers land use 
decisions and important environmental and economic outcomes.  We postpone the challenge of 
identifying the extent and relative importance of the different types of externalities and the 
appropriate types of policy interventions for Sections 5 and 6. 
(a) Externalities, Irrigation, and High-Biodiversity Andean Maize and Potatoes  
Upstream-downstream effects of spatial externalities are common in irrigated agriculture 
of developing countries that has gained interest for a pair of reasons. First, many such irrigation 
systems belong to small- and meso-scale development efforts, whose environmental and social 
benefits (and lower costs) have led to the support of these systems as a growing alternative to, 
though only partial replacement of, big-dam projects (Ostrom et al., 1999; Siebert et al., 2005). 
Second, one of the environmental advantages of smaller-scale irrigation systems, in contrast to 
those associated with big-dam projects, is the continued cropping – known as in situ 
conservation – of biologically diverse food plants, such as the so-called creole types that 
represent local Farmer Varieties (FVs) of local food plants (Bellon et al. 2006; Riedsma et al., 
2006; Zimmerer and Carter 2008).  In Peru and Bolivia, Andean highland farmers cultivate 
numerous biological diverse types of Andean maize (Sanchez et al., 2006), several of which are 
still common in small- and medium-scale irrigation systems. These local maize types could 
contribute to sustainability by increasing agroecological resilience under increased market 
integration and a high degree of environmental uncertainty (Aggarwal, 2006; Brookfield, 2001)--
-the latter appears to be worsening as a consequence of climate change and presumed global   9
warming. Since irrigation at the local and meso-scales is often only partially modernized and 
technified, the flows of water, as well as sediment transport, are only partly controlled. In such 
situations the problem of too much water or sediment can spill over into an adjacent field and 
create a negative spatial externality that may result in the downstream grower switching their 
land-use to activities that are potentially less valuable and less biologically diverse.  While 
informal relationships and common-property management of irrigation infrastructure may exist, 
there are no formal legal restrictions regarding water or sediment spillover effects. On the other 
hand it may be that the clustering in cropping patterns by growers in adjacent upstream-
downstream locations results in benefits that would be greater than the alternative case of the 
lack of clustering. These clustering outcomes could contain either high-agrobiodiversity or low-
agrobiodiversity production. 
In areas of high-agrobiodiversity Andean potatoes (similar to global biodiversity 
“hotspots”), which are mostly located in upper agricultural areas (above 3800 meters in areas 
from central Peru to central Bolivia), one of the main negative spatial externalities in land-use 
systems is the risk of livestock damage to crops. The latter is due to livestock, especially cattle 
and sheep (as well as alpacas and llamas), that graze on extensive rangelands---often with 
increasing herd sizes in conjunction with cropping decline and the disintensification of agro-
pastoral coordination (Brush et al., 1992; Mayer 2002; Zimmerer 2002, 2004). One main reason 
for the generally high level of the risk of livestock (and wildlife) damage is that these high-
agrobiodiversity fields are often located out of the way and out of sight of homes and settled 
areas. While informal remedies and common property regulations may exist, there is often the 
lack of readily accessible or formal legal methods for recovering damages from livestock. There 
could also be positive social spatial externalities associated with coordinated labor activities on   10
remote fields, or in livestock supervision.  Such coordination may involve field-level cropping 
decisions as well as multi-field systems (tens to hundreds) of common field agriculture or 
sectoral fallow (Zimmerer 2002). Understanding more about the interplay of externalities in 
these contexts is essential to understanding the microeconomic logic of environmental and 
economic outcomes in high-agrobiodiversity in situ conservation.  
(b) Externalities, Conventional- Organic, and GM - Non-GM Relationships  
  Pesticide and pollen drift are recent and well known examples of neighboring land-use 
conflict in agriculture in the United States.  Both types of drift are relevant to organic farmers 
that locate downwind from conventional farmers, because pesticides and GM pollen can 
contaminate organic produce, and thereby lower market returns associated with “organic” status. 
Legally, there is no formal protection afforded to organic farms from drift in the U.S. (Conner, 
2003), while property rights are more contested elsewhere (e.g., Canada and Europe). Likewise, 
farmers choosing to produce corn or soybeans using non-GM varieties (potentially as part of a 
marketing strategy for securing a higher return) can be negatively affected by pollen drift from 
proximate GM producers if their product is found to contain GM residues or pollen. The legal 
restrictions regarding drift from GM crops generally vary across regions, with Europe having 
perhaps the most developed and variegated rules related to GM, non-GM coexistence and the 
United States having relatively little protection of non-GM producers (Beckmann et al., 2006). 
Both pesticide and pollen drift are negative, one-directional environmental externalities.  And, 
while the focus in this paper is on organic versus conventional and GM versus non-GM farming 
strategies, the issue of pesticide drift is relevant to other cultivation choices.  For example, in 
Northern California, rice farmers have been known to apply broad-spectrum phenoxy herbicides 
to their land.  However, cotton is extremely sensitive to phenoxies and the application of   11
phenoxy herbicide to rice fields led to a string of lawsuits from neighboring cotton growers in the 
late 1990s (Parker, 2000).   
  A fundamental difference between the organic-conventional and GM vs. Non-GM cases 
is that in the former the “new” production technology is the receiver of the negative externality 
while in the latter it is the source of the negative externality.   Put differently, farmers choosing 
to use organic methods may have to choose their locale carefully to avoid or reduce the potential 
for negative externalities from neighboring conventional farmers, while farmers choosing to use 
GM crops do not face that issue at all.  Instead, farmers that cultivate non-GM varieties may find 
the recent GM adoption of neighboring farmers threatening their farm strategy, which could 
prompt either a switch in strategy or the need to move.  Negative externalities may be part of the 
story when it comes to the clustering of organic farms or GM crop production.  Clustering could 
also be driven by positive social externalities associated with new technology adoption or other 
aspects of the operation (harvest labor recruitment, marketing and distribution cost reduction, 
and the like).  We explore the implications of positive and negative externalities later in the 
paper. 
3. RESEARCH ON SPATIAL INTERACTIONS AND AGROENVIRONMENTAL 
CLUSTERING 
Externalities give rise to potentially inefficient private decision-making in the presence of 
significant transactions costs and potential free-riding.  Until recently, studies of agricultural 
externalities have been focused almost entirely on non-point source pollution (usually soil 
erosion and associated nutrient flows), which is an environmental externality derived from the 
effect of individual farmer decisions on society (e.g. see Segerson 1988).  However, spatial 
externalities operating between agricultural users have a different microeconomic structure than   12
the case of non-point source pollution because of the externality effects of one parcel’s land use 
on the private returns of neighboring land.  The literature on spatial relationships within 
agriculture is primarily focused on testing econometric and statistical techniques to identify 
spatial correlation among agricultural producers, with little attention to the microeconomic 
structure governing spatial interactions within agriculture.
1  One recent theoretical exploration 
that is quite comparable to the modeling approach developed below is that of Beckmann and 
Wesseler (2006, 2007), as applied to the “co-existence” of transgenic and non-transgenic crops 
in Europe.  They explore analytically (not empirically) how the ex ante regulations and ex post 
liability implications of “polluting” non-transgenic producers are likely to shape the transgenic 
adoption choices of European farmers. 
 Theoretical work in the forestry literature has addressed spatial externalities between 
stands (Swallow and Wear 1993) and spatial interactions within a single manager’s landholdings 
(Albers 1996).
2  Likewise, a portion of the literature on the spatial aspects of Land Use/Cover 
Change (LUCC) has addressed the microeconomic structure of spatial interactions between land 
uses.  Most prominent is the research documenting the positive open-space benefit generated by 
farmland and capitalized into adjacent urban lands (Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; Caruso et al., 
2007).  Irwin and Bockstael (2002) contend that the primary challenge of such analyses is the 
empirical identification of spatial externalities apart from unobserved landscape attributes, both 
of which may yield observationally equivalent landscape outcomes.  For example, two adjacent 
parcels of land may convert to urban development because of spatial externalities between them, 
or because both parcels are located near a scenic hillside which provides amenities to potential 
residents.  If the location of the hillside is unobserved by the researcher, it is not possible to 
identify the cause of the land-use decisions as arising from spatial externalities or from the   13
hillside.
3  Irwin and Bockstael (2002) are able to identify a negative spatial externality associated 
with urban development which they claim is partly responsible for the phenomenon of “urban 
sprawl.” By contrast, interactions and spatial interdependencies among the field units within 
agricultural areas---related to spatial externalities---have not been estimated thus far in the 
literature, nor have they been derived from a structural model of agricultural spatial externalities.  
A notable exception is the recent paper by Parker and Munroe (2007) that documents the 
presence of spatial externalities relevant to organic agriculture in California, although it does not 
identify the directionality (positive/negative) of these effects.
4 
Many studies belonging to the LUCC literature are designed to estimate the influence of 
various factors that may contribute to environmental outcomes (including the clustering of land 
use types), although most studies are not specifically focused on interactions within agriculture.
5 
The factors commonly included in these LUCC models of spatial land use include distance 
effects (e.g., along transportation routes); population parameters (within rural households and 
locales); market integration (both products and labor); household portfolio effects (such as 
demography, labor availability, migration earnings, and access to machinery and other 
technology); commodity prices (crops, forest products), and environmental attributes. These 
LUCC studies typically employ large amounts of spatial data in Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS), and use a variety of econometric and statistical techniques to quantify relationships. While 
the LUCC literature is able to quantify the influence of many different variables on the spatial 
pattern of land use, the reduced-form nature of most of these models make it difficult to 
distinguish between correlation and causation.  Understanding the causal relationships between 
individual land-use choices and landscape outcomes requires a structural economic framework to 
explain an individual’s land-use decision (Irwin and Geoghegan, 2001).   14
A closely related literature that examines the structure of interactions among proximate 
producers is the social learning models of technology adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; 
Conley and Udry, 2005).  Researchers strive to identify the presence of social learning in the 
diffusion of agricultural technologies based on information (or assumptions) on the social 
“neighborhood” of farmers from which each producer might learn.  Like other papers in the 
social effects literature (see Manski, 1995; Brock and Durlauf, 2001 for comprehensive reviews), 
the core challenge that demands both a careful structural model and econometric specification 
design is finding ways to effectively separate out learning processes from other potential 
explanations for why behavior might be clustered, such as similar growing conditions, access to 
key inputs, and endogenous groupings that do not necessarily indicate “learning”.  Specifically, 
the structure of these models focuses on identifying the relevant information neighborhood for 
farmers. This is typically constructed from social data related to whom they know and watch, 
rather than spatial data related to who are their physical location-based neighbors.  In that sense, 
our focus below on social spatial externalities intersects with those papers, but it is also distinct 
because of our emphasis on the spatial dimension of these externalities. 
Agroenvironmental and land use clustering is also often seen through the perspective of 
environmental management that is associated with common property resources (Agrawal and 
Chhatre, 2006; Berkes 2004; Ostrom et al., 1999; St. Martin, 2006). Here, the present research 
must be seen as contributing an examination of one of the main factors that leads to informal 
land- and resource-use coordination, namely the spatial externalities of agricultural management 
at the field level. 
4. STATISTICAL IDENTIFICATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SPATIAL 
EXTERNALITIES: A MODEL   15
  The private allocation of land use will not necessarily maximize economic welfare—
defined here as the total value of land—because i) spatial externalities that impact landowners’ 
private return streams may be present, and ii) environmental quality associated with landscape 
pattern has public good characteristics that are typically ignored in private land allocation.  The 
fact that most agricultural landscapes comprise multiple agents implies that decentralized 
Coasian bargaining approaches to externality problems may be difficult to construct.  Since 
privately allocated landscape patterns depend on the aforementioned spatial externalities and do 
not depend on the public good values of environmental quality, we focus on spatial externalities 
rather than public good values.   
Designing land-use policies to enhance economic welfare is only possible to the extent 
that spatial externalities can be quantified.  If researchers have complete information on parcel-
level economic returns to various land-uses, quantifying the presence of spatial externalities is a 
simple accounting exercise.  Unfortunately, parcel-level net returns to alternative land uses are 
often not observable by researchers, making it difficult to document the effects of agricultural 
spatial externalities. Fortunately, recent advances in the availability of spatial land-use data from 
satellite imagery and aerial photography give rise to the possibility of inferring the presence of 
spatial externalities through the observation of landscape change. In this section we develop a 
simple model of land use to present conditions under which spatial externalities can be 
empirically identified by observing landscape outcomes. In particular, our model yields insights 
into potential empirical designs to document the presence of spatial externalities within 
agriculture. 
Identifying the presence of a spatial externality is necessary but not sufficient to prescribe 
a welfare-enhancing policy.  The ultimate design of such policies crucially depends on whether   16
the externalities are positive or negative.  For example, a negative externality associated with a 
specific land use choice suggests a policy to discourage that choice, while a positive externality 
suggests a policy to encourage the choice. As discussed below, negative or positive spatial 
externalities can lead to observationally equivalent landscape outcomes, making empirical 
documentation of the sign of externalities challenging.  We illustrate the complexities of 
prescribing welfare-enhancing policies for spatial externalities by describing scenarios where 
mis-identifying the spatial externality results in both efficient and inefficient policy mechanisms. 
(a) Model setup and the value to clustering 
In this section we develop a simple model of one-directional spatial externalities—or the 
situation where the actions of one landowner have an impact on the land-use returns to another 
landowner, but not vice versa.
6  Consider a simple landscape with 2 profit-maximizing 
landowners (1 and 2) who share a border.  For simplicity, we assume a frictionless world with no 
information or market imperfections other than the spatial externalities, though we highlight 
some real-world imperfections in section 6.  We assume the productive and managerial 
characteristics of each parcel and landowner can be represented by a single index, q, which 
henceforth will be referred to as land quality.  Land quality is assumed to be homogeneous 
within a parcel and heterogeneous across parcels.  Heterogeneity in land quality is what gives 
rise to multiple uses coinciding on a single landscape.
7  We assume that there are two distinct 
agricultural uses to which each parcel can be devoted: A and B.  For landowner 1, the net returns 
to uses A and B are defined as 11 ()
A R fq =  and 11 ()
B R gq = .  For landowner 2, the net returns to 




Au R fq u =  and
1 ,
22 1 (|)
Bu R gq u =  where u1 indicates the land-use of landowner 1, and is   17
equal to A or B.
8  The net return functions to both landowners are increasing and strictly concave 
in land quality.  
  Quantification of spatial externalities requires knowledge of the net returns to various 
land uses in-lieu-of the effects from neighboring land uses.  Define 2
A R  and 2
B R  as the net returns 
to landowner 2 from use A and B for the situation where the landowner has no neighboring 
agricultural uses—and hence, no externalities affecting their net returns.  These return 
functions 2
A R  and 2
B R  are henceforth referred to as baseline returns.  Figure 1 provides an example 
of how baseline returns could be inferred.  Suppose landowner 2’s net returns are influenced by 
the decisions of landowner 1, while landowner 3 has net returns that are independent of the 
decisions of landowner 1.  For landowner 3, the net returns to uses A and B are defined as 
33 ()
A R fq =  and 33 ()
B R gq = .  If land quality for landowner 3 is identical to landowner 2 (q3=q2), 
then 3
A R  and 3
B R provide information as to the magnitude of 2
A R  and 2
B R .  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Suppose all parcel-specific return functions are known by researchers.  In this context, 
the value of the spatial externality can be described by
21 2 ,
22
uu u R R − , where ui is equal to A or B.  
For example, a positive spatial externality from like uses would be observed if
,
22
AA A R R − >0.  




AB A R R − < 0.   
In this study, we assume that landowner 2’s net returns to use A or B are lower if their 
land use choice is different than landowner 1: 
,,
22
AA AB R R >  and
,,
22
BB BA R R > .  Therefore, we 
confine our interest to two types of externalities relevant for agriculture:  i) positive spatial 
externalities associated with identical neighboring land uses, and ii) negative spatial externalities   18
associated with different neighboring land uses.  More specifically, we assume that there is a 
non-negative value to the spatial clustering of identical land uses, although the cause of this 
value could be either a positive or negative spatial externality. 
(b) Identification with partial information on land-use returns 
Since parcel-level returns are difficult to observe in practice, an alternative approach to 
empirically identifying spatial externalities is through the observation of landscape pattern.  
Suppose the researcher cannot calculate the magnitude of baseline returns, but can infer the sign 
of 22
BA R R −  as positive.  For example, in the context of figure 1,  22
BA R R − >0 could be inferred by 
observing that parcel 3 is in use B, as long as q3=q2.  Information on the sign of 22
BA R R −  can be 
combined with spatial information on landscape configuration to infer the presence of spatial 
externalities. In our simple model of two neighboring landowners, there are four potential 
landscape configurations (table 1).  Observation of a particular landscape configuration allows 
inference as to which use is more profitable, which we term the equilibrium condition in table 1. 




uu u R R − , which is only possible when combined with information on the sign of 22
BA R R − . 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Suppose the sign of 22
BA R R −  is known to be positive, such that use B is the preferred 
baseline use. In this case, the presence of a spatial externality can be identified by observing the 
clustered (A, A) landscape configuration, since profit-maximizing landowner 2 would not place 
land into use A in the baseline.  Since B is the preferred baseline use, observing the clustered (A, 
A) configuration suggests the presence of either a positive spatial externality associated with 
identical neighboring uses, or a negative spatial externality associated with different neighboring 
uses.  A necessary condition for the clustered (A, A) configuration is   19
,,
22 2 2 () () 0
AA A B BA RRR R −+− > , which is consistent with a combination of positive and negative 
spatial externalities, or one externality and not the other.  The clustered (A, A) configuration 
could be driven by only positive or only negative externalities if the magnitude of the externality 
exceeds 22
BA R R − .
9  Therefore, while the clustered (A, A) configuration is sufficient to infer a 
positive value to clustering, it is not sufficient to infer the causality of such value as arising from 
a positive or negative spatial externality. 
Now consider the observation of the other landscape configurations when B is the 
preferred baseline use.  We can rule out the fragmented (B, A) configuration since we are 
assuming only non-negative values to clustering identical land uses.  Observation of either the 
fragmented (A, B) or clustered (B, B) landscape configurations does not allow any inference 
regarding the spatial externality since landowner 2 would have placed their parcel in use B in the 
baseline.
10  Therefore, inference of spatial externalities when B is the preferred baseline use is 
only possible when the clustered (A, A) configuration is observed. Using the same logic, if A is 
the preferred baseline use ( 22 0
BA RR −< ), the presence of a spatial externality could be identified 
by observation of the clustering (B, B) configuration, while either the fragmented (B, A) or the 
clustered (A, A) configurations do not allow inference, and the fragmented (A, B) configuration 
is inconsistent with our assumption about a non-negative value to clustering. 
(c) Identification with no information on land-use returns 
Suppose there is no way for the researcher to infer the sign of 22
BA R R − .  In this case, the 
preferred baseline use can not be discerned, and any inference made about the spatial externality 
is not possible in the absence of a natural experiment or exogenous shock which alters the 
configuration of the landscape.  For illustration purposes, consider the clustering (A, A) 
configuration.  Now suppose an exogenous shock strikes the landscape such that it converts to   20
the fragmented (A, B) configuration, moving landowner 2 to land-use choice B.  Such a shock 
allows us to identify the presence of a spatial externality if the shock can be interpreted as 
negating the value to clustering like land-uses.  This interpretation is consistent with a shock that 
a) eliminated the positive spatial externality associated with similar land uses, b) eliminated the 
negative spatial externality associated with different land uses, or c) eliminated some 
combination of the two externalities.  Experimental design could be used to identify the specific 
externality, and we provide examples below. 
If the shock results in the clustered (B, B) configuration, it will generally not be possible 
to identify the externality because the spatial pattern of the landscape has not changed.  
However, inference of spatial externalities can also be achieved if there exists a shock that 
converts a landscape from the fragmented (A, B) to the clustered (A, A) configuration, the 
fragmented (B, A) to the clustered (B, B) configuration, or from the clustered (B, B) to the 
fragmented (B, A) configuration.  All other conversions provide no information on spatial 
externalities because the parcel which is affected by the externality (parcel 2) does not change 
uses. Likewise, conversions between the fragmented configurations are inconsistent with a 
positive value to clustering. So, a necessary condition for identification is a natural experiment 
which alters the use of the parcel affected by the externality, and alters the spatial configuration 
of the landscape.  Table 2 summarizes the conditions under which spatial externalities can be 
inferred from agricultural land-use data.  As summarized in table 2, spatial data for one point in 
time can be used to identify spatial externalities if partial information on baseline returns is 
available.  If baseline returns information is unavailable, spatial externalities can only be 
identified with spatial data for multiple points in time with landscape changes. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]   21
 (d) Welfare-enhancing policies 
  A welfare-enhancing policy mechanism may reward some land-uses, penalize some land-
uses, or consist of a mix of rewards and penalties.  Getting the policy mix right is only possible if 
the various spatial externalities at work can be empirically identified.
11  Thus, next we consider 
the design of welfare-enhancing economic incentives aimed at altering landscape configurations 
and internalizing spatial externalities.  While we focus on policies to alter landscape 
configuration, it should be noted that the optimal policy only coincides with changing land use if 
the total value of land can be raised by altering landscape pattern. We show that wrongly 
identifying the cause of the value to clustering can result in policies which are not welfare 
enhancing, and may in fact be welfare decreasing.   
First, consider the situation where the same efficient landscape can be achieved 
regardless of whether the value to clustering is correctly identified as arising from positive or 
negative externalities.  For illustration purposes, suppose B is the preferred baseline use 
( 22
BA R R − >0), clustered (A, A) is the observed configuration (
,,
22
BA AA R R − <0), and the maximum 




BB B R R + ).  Therefore, a policy which causes landowner 1 to switch to B would maximize 
welfare because landowner 2 would also switch to use B to maximize profits.  If the externality 
is believed to be a negative externality arising from different neighboring uses, a tax on 
landowner 1 equal to the externality (
,
22
BA B R R − ) would induce a switch to use B—and hence, a 
switch from the clustered (A, A) to the clustered (B, B) configuration.
12  Likewise, if the 
externality is believed to be positive and arising from similar neighboring uses, subsidizing 
landowner 1’s decision to use B by
,
22
BB B R R −  would induce them to switch to use B.  So, the   22
efficiency consequences of either policy are the same, although the distributional consequences 
are clearly different.      
  Second, consider the situation where mis-identifying the cause of the value to clustering 
suggests an inefficient policy mechanism.  As above, suppose B is the preferred baseline use to 
parcel 2, but that clustered (A, A) is the observed configuration.  Now, however, suppose that the 
cause of the value to clustering is a negative externality from opposing land uses. Further, 
suppose that the negative externality from landowner 1’s choice of use A could be eliminated at 
cost c without requiring a switch to use B.  Therefore, if 12
AB R cR −+  is the maximum possible 
value associated with a landscape configuration, a policy which eliminates the negative 
externality at cost c would maximize economic welfare.
13  However, if the researcher interprets 
the value to clustering as arising from a positive spatial externality, then a policy which 
encourages either of the clustered landscape configurations would be proposed, and welfare-
maximization would not be achieved. 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES: CASE STUDIES 
  Sorting out which spatial externality—if any—is present requires careful experimental 
design and is necessary for the prescription of welfare-enhancing policies.  Here we propose 
empirical experiments aimed at identifying spatial externalities associated with the four 
examples from section 2.  Each example uses the model in section 4 as basis for an identification 
strategy.  In practice, each identification strategy requires empirical control of all non-externality 
components of the return functions. 
(a) Upstream-downstream landowners and irrigation projects 
In many Andean countries, the movement of water and sediment transport occurs from 
upstream to downstream parcels and thus creates a one-directional spatial externality (introduced   23
in Section 2a above).  In this case, a downstream landowner’s returns to specific crop choices 
depend on an upstream owner’s irrigation practices, and we might expect to see clustered land 
uses in the absence of policy intervention.  There are two potential empirical designs that could 
identify a spatial externality in this context.  First, suppose we can get information on baseline 
returns by observing a landscape similar to figure 1.  As discussed earlier, if parcel 1’s land use 
choice impacts parcel 2 but not parcel 3, then baseline information on parcel 2’s returns could be 
inferred by observing parcel 3’s land use choice. If parcels 2 and 3 are in different uses, this 
observation could be used to identify the externality.  Second, suppose there is no baseline 
information and we need to identify a landscape-converting shock.  One potential shock is an 
irrigation project exogenously introduced by a development organization and unanticipated by 
resident landowners.  If the irrigation project allows the downstream owner to control the timing 
of her irrigation independent of the upstream owner, ex-post observation of a change in 
landscape configuration from clustering to fragmentation—where the downstream parcel 
switches use—could be used to identify the presence of the spatial externality.   
Now consider the interpretation of whether the externality is positive or negative when 
partial information on baseline returns can be discerned by observing the land use of parcel 3. 
We can infer the presence of a negative spatial externality if parcel 2’s use is identical to parcel 
1’s, and different from parcel 3.  This interpretation is possible because any positive spatial 
externality from neighboring landowner 1 to landowner 2 could also induce landowner 3 to 
choose use B.  Therefore, the likely explanation for the clustering of landowners 1 and 2 would 
be a negative spatial externality from parcel 1.  If there is no information on baseline returns, 
interpreting the sign of the ex-ante externality can be accomplished in a similar way.  If an 
irrigation project causes the landscape to switch from clustering to fragmented, then one can   24
infer that the original clustered landscape resulted more from the negative externality than the 
positive externality, because the irrigation project should only serve to reduce the negative 
externality. So, this example provides a clean approach to both identifying the presence and the 
sign of any potential upstream-downstream externalities.   
(b) Organic and Conventional Farming 
  We expect clustering of organic and conventional farms, characterized by pesticide drift 
from conventional farming—a one-directional externality—and potential knowledge spillovers 
between organic farms—a two-directional externality.  One way to setup an experiment of the 
organic-conventional farming relationship is to recognize that conventional farms have 
historically been the first-movers on most landscapes, while organic farms are typically faced 
with a choice of where to locate on a landscape of conventional farms.  Since the clustering of 
the first organic farms on the landscape may be affected by high transaction costs associated with 
coordination, the first organic farms have an incentive to locate in areas where they are naturally 
isolated from pesticide drift and other environmental externalities that might affect their 
certification process—parcel 1 in Figure 2.  Subsequent organic farms would then have incentive 
to locate on parcels 2 or 3 to take advantage of positive spillovers from organic farms and fewer 
conventional neighbors.  Therefore, observation of landscape change of this type could be used 
to infer the presence of spatial externalities associated with conventional farms, provided that 
prices and soil quality can be adequately controlled for in the analysis.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
  Now consider the interpretation of whether the externality is positive or negative during 
the landscape conversions described above.  If the first organic farms to populate the landscape 
locate in the heads of remote valleys (parcel 1 in figure 2), then this is clear evidence of negative   25
spatial externalities associated with pesticide drift from conventional farms.  If subsequent 
organic farms cluster near the first organic farms (parcels 2 and 3 in figure 2), this is evidence of 
either positive or negative spatial externalities, but not evidence of one and not the other.  For 
example, if parcel 1 was the first organic farm, the next organic farm could choose to locate on 
parcel 2 to either avoid pesticide drift or to take advantage of knowledge spillovers from parcel 
1.  An observation that organic farms are clustered—without knowledge of the dynamic process 
used to arrive at that clustering—is insufficient to identify the sign of potential spatial 
externalities.  The key to identifying pesticide drift or other contaminants as a significant spatial 
externality using landscape data is to observe the first organic farms locating in pockets isolated 
from conventional growers. 
(c) Clustering of biodiverse Andean potatoes in relation to livestock management 
 
Andean potato production may be affected by livestock from adjoining areas—a negative 
externality—and management coordination from adjacent remote potato fields—a positive 
externality.  A potential empirical framework to analyze such externalities would be cross-
sectional or panel analysis of a large landscape with significant variation in the locations at 
which potatoes and livestock are found.  For example, a spatial externalities story would be 
consistent with the observation of potato production clustered together, livestock production 
clustered together, but little overlap between those competing land uses.  More specifically, we 
might hypothesize a livestock to vulnerable land area threshold (e.g. percentage of a region in 
livestock production) at which we no longer observe potato production in conjunction with 
livestock production. An analysis of this type could be accomplished with satellite / aerial 
photography of a large region which could discern potatoes from livestock.  Ideally, a panel data   26
set could be constructed where any dynamic process of land conversion could be analyzed and a 
livestock threshold identified.   
Interpretation of the sign of spatial externalities associated with potato and livestock 
production is not straightforward.  If the cross-sectional—or panel—analysis only yields 
evidence that potato production is clustered, this result could be due to either positive or negative 
spatial externalities and is not sufficient to identify one or the other.  However, if a livestock 
threshold can be identified, this could be used as evidence regarding the presence of negative 
livestock externalities. One key to using this result as evidence of the sign of spatial externalities 
will be the ability to control for the possibility of increasing returns to scale from the positive 
spatial externality (e.g. the reduced fixed costs of transporting labor to remote fields).. 
(d) GMO and Non-GMO Farms 
  Pollen drift from GMO to non-GMO fields represents a negative environmental 
externality, while technology adoption associated with neighboring GMO fields represents a 
positive externality.  An experimental design of the GMO / Non-GMO relationship recognizes 
the symmetry with the organic / conventional experiment described above.  Namely, non-GMO 
farms have historically been the first-movers, populating the landscape well before GMO farms, 
while GMO farms came later by selecting where to locate on a landscape of non-GMO farms.   
Since the clustering of the first GMO farms on the landscape may be affected by high 
transactions costs associated with coordination, the first GMO farms are likely to locate 
randomly on the landscape.  This is opposite to the organic farmer’s incentive to locate in areas 
isolated from pesticide drift.  Subsequent GMO farms may then have incentive to locate adjacent 
to the first GMO farms to take advantage of knowledge spillovers associated with technology 
adoption (a positive spatial externality), while those non-GMO farms that were adjacent to the   27
initial GMO farms have an incentive to move or adopt GMO practices to avoid pollen drift (a 
negative spatial externality). Therefore, observation of landscape conversion of this type could 
be used to infer the presence of spatial externalities associated with GMO farms.  However, 
evidence of the first GMO farms locating randomly on the landscape is not suggestive of any 
particular spatial externality.  Further, evidence of subsequent GMO farms clustering near the 
original GMO farms provides evidence of spatial externalities, but these externalities could be in 
the form of pollen drift (a negative externality) or technology adoption spillovers (a positive 
externality).      
6. DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH 
SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES IN AGRICULTURE 
  The previous sections explored analytical and empirical strategies for identifying spatial 
externalities in agriculture, both environmental and social, in order to help inform policy making 
that might improve development and sustainability outcomes.  In this section, we unpack the 
policy challenge more carefully in order to inform future research and analysis that seeks to 
develop specific policy recommendations.   
(a) Policy design and microeconomic foundations 
  Typically, resolving externalities, once they are properly identified, is a relatively simple 
task in economic analysis.  Policy makers can use either a subsidy or a tax (the Pigouvian 
solution) to internalize the externality in the private decision-maker’s problem and bring the 
private and social benefit-cost measures into alignment.  Drawing from the Andean irrigated 
agriculture example, if the upstream landowner’s decision to plant alfalfa is reducing the joint 
returns to land by compelling the downstream landowner(s) to also grow alfalfa rather than   28
maize, then either a subsidy or a tax could accomplish a change in the upstream landowners land 
use and improve local economic returns.   
Two features of spatial externalities in agriculture complicate the policy analysis 
considerably.  First, heterogeneity among the farmers in terms of wealth, access to markets and 
technology, knowledge, and/or managerial skill could provide a basis for differences in return 
functions that in turn shape patterns of land use.  As a result, resolving the spatial externality 
among local economic agents might be more complicated than it seems at first glance, because 
the pattern of returns resulting from different land uses could stem from constraints land users 
face on the best potential use.  In the case of Andean irrigated agriculture, it is possible that 
downstream farmers would also enjoy higher returns from alfalfa if their wealth levels were 
higher or credit markets worked well, so they could afford to own and husband livestock.  In that 
case, the best development policy (in terms of local economic returns) might be one that allowed 
the clustering of activity to center on alfalfa and livestock cultivation rather than Andean maize.  
The proper subsidy or policy intervention would be one that allowed the downstream owner to 
fully exploit the potential value of land in alfalfa production. 
 The second complicating feature is that the environmental benefits and costs associated 
with spatial externalities in agriculture generally will be experienced at a social level, which is 
well beyond the calculus of the local land users.  Returning again to the Andean highlands case, 
the benefits of maintaining agrobiodiversity in maize production are generally geographically 
diffuse.  While some of the benefits in terms of improving varieties and reducing risk are 
realized at a regional and national level, agrobiodiversity (like all forms of biodiversity) is 
inherently a global public good (Barrett et al., 2001; Cooper et al. 2005).  Furthermore, neither 
the regional nor the national benefit streams, or the global ones, are likely to be captured through   29
market mechanisms by local land owners.  Yet, the potential costs of conservation associated 
with growing maize rather than cultivating alfalfa and livestock (if that latter combination was 
the optimal unconstrained private use) are experienced directly by the land users unless there is 
some sort of public or social transfer mechanism (policy or program) that reduces the burden.  
Thus, if the best land use outcome from a global perspective for the Andean highlands (taking 
into account both the local economic returns and the global benefits of agrobiodiverse maize 
production) is to have the land in agrobiodiverse maize, then an integrated development and 
environment policy would subsidize the cultivation of agrobiodiverse maize sufficiently to 
compensate for the foregone returns associated with the joint alfalfa-livestock system.   
Taking stock of the policy implications of spatial externalities in agriculture, 
heterogeneity in return structure, and the mismatch of environmental benefits and costs 
associated with alternate land uses, we identified three distinctive policy interventions, each quite 
different in its orientation.  The first one involved incentives to lead the upstream landowner to 
shift to maize cultivation in order to achieve the higher joint return outcome.  The second helped 
the downstream landowner to overcome the constraint that limited the productivity of land in 
alfalfa to achieve an even higher joint return.  The third compensated both upstream and 
downstream landowners for contributing to agrobiodiversity through maize production to 
compensate for the losses they would otherwise experience relative to the higher return 
combination of alfalfa and livestock.  And, these different policy interventions hinged on one set 
of assumptions about the structure of returns and the benefits associated with agrobiodiversity 
from this particular locale. Other assumptions would generate different scenarios of externality 
effects and thus different sorts of policy implications and recommendations.   30
Explicit attention to spatial externalities in agriculture holds the potential to deepen our 
understanding of development and environment outcomes and hence ways in which policy 
interventions or institutional initiatives might be made more effective.  Consider the likely 
possibility that some, but not all, parcels respond to a policy by converting their land to a 
different use.  The presence of spatial externalities between parcels suggests that policy-induced 
change on parcel A may yield cascading effects whereby parcel A’s neighbors alter their land 
use simply because A’s conversion alters its production of spatial externalities.  For example, 
suppose a policy to increase access to credit results in upstream maize growers switching uses to 
alfalfa.  The presence of spatial externalities could then result in downstream neighbors 
switching to alfalfa as well – an indirect and potentially unintended consequence of the credit 
policy.  Likewise, suppose an environmental organization wishes to encourage the production of 
biodiverse maize by offering payments to landowners to convert production from alfalfa to 
maize.  If the payments were targeted to upstream landowners rather than uniformly offered 
across the landscape, the reduction of negative upstream externalities from alfalfa could result in 
downstream landowners switching to maize – a positive indirect consequence that has clear 
efficiency implications.  
(b) Institutions at the local, regional, and global levels 
The choice of policy-making and implementing institutions ranges widely in the 
development and environmental issues associated with spatial externalities. Appropriate 
institutions range from local to national and global organizations. Consider first the case of a 
positive spatial externality in agriculture that has local economic effects and possibly local 
environmental ones, but not discernable region- or global-level effects.  In this instance, the main 
focus of policy or institutional interventions would be to encourage farmer-to-farmer interactions   31
in order to “internalize” the externality through cooperation that could be facilitated in diverse 
ways, both formal and informal.  Local-level extension personnel of government agencies, such 
as the important though still small number of farm agents that are supportive of organic farming 
(e.g., extension agents in western Wisconsin which has an actively growing organic-dairy 
sector), could aid in addressing externalities in this way. Local institutional innovations, such as 
production cooperatives or resource-users’ groups, also offer the capacity to design and 
implement policies, as well as information exchange and informal dispute resolution, which 
could effectively address spatial externalities.
14 Resource-users’ groups are common, for 
example, in many sites of irrigated agriculture, including the small- and meso-scale systems of 
irrigation in Andean countries, mentioned above, that are characterized by the cultivation of 
high-agrobiodiversity maize. Drawing on this example, the irrigation-users’ groups illustrate a 
potentially important local-level institution---whose membership includes the irrigators who own 
or have access otherwise to adjacent fields along canals---that can inform and aid in the 
determination and implementation of the policies needed to address spatial externalities. 
National and region-level institutions (both regions within countries and multi-country 
regions) are important to the policy issues regarding such spatial externalities in development 
and environment as each of the agricultural landscape issues described above (see Section II). 
These institutions are most able to develop comparative assessments that are adequately fine-
grain yet broad enough to address the heterogeneity that is characteristic of and crucial to 
guiding policy-analysis and policy-making. As described above (Part A), such heterogeneity 
includes the dimension of microeconomic structures and processes such as field-level return 
functions, household-level portfolio assets, and the role of risk management in crop choice and 
farm management. A national or region-level growers’ cooperative, such as the Organic Valley   32
cooperative (based in western Wisconsin and currently operating in approximately 25 states 
within the USA), is therefore potentially useful in policy instruments, since its members 
represent a range of farm types within organic dairy-farming that nonetheless face certain similar 
“edge effects” (both potentially positive and negative) due to spatial externalities. Another 
dimension of heterogeneity involves the characterization of variation in the biophysical 
environment. High-biodiversity production Andean maize (versus low-biodiversity farming 
types), mentioned above, also is useful here as an example since policies on spatial externalities 
would need to account for the environmental properties of this biodiversity. Such information 
would include the level and uniqueness of biodiversity found within and among units of 
agricultural landscapes. Genetic variation is a component of this environmental heterogeneity 
whose analysis (e.g., maize genomics) and spatial-environmental properties (e.g., landscape or 
geo-genetics) are increasingly well-known and potentially well-suited to externality policies. 
With regard to both socioeconomic and environmental heterogeneity, as described above, we 
note that many national- and region-level institutions, such as government agencies, NGOs, or 
international agencies with emphasis on Andean or Latin American mountain agriculture, would 
serve as capable contributors regarding externality policies.
15 
Global institutions are also important to the public-goods character of issues, and hence 
as policy institutions, involving the spatial externalities of development-environment issues. 
Consider once again our example of agrobiodiverse maize where the global benefits of 
agrobiodiverse maize production are sufficiently large to warrant a subsidy to local producers to 
switch them out of the more profitable alfalfa-livestock combination that would otherwise be the 
optimal development policy.  In that instance, the process of policy formulation and 
implementation would reach from local farmer organizations to national governments to global   33
governance bodies, and back via the same institutions, in order to achieve the welfare-
maximizing outcome.  The policy intervention might still be simple, a subsidy to farmers 
growing agrobiodiverse maize, but the coordination required to achieve that goal would require 
the funding and support of appropriate policy institutions at the national-regional level as well as 
at the global level.  Such global institutions that could contribute to policy on maize 
agrobiodiversity range from lending agencies with environmental mandates (World Bank, and 
the Global Environmental Facility, GEF, that is Bank-funded) to the global agricultural centers 
with development-environment mandates, which in the Andean countries would include CIAT 
(International Center for Tropical Agriculture, in Cali, Colombia) and CIP (International Potato 
Center, in Lima, Peru). Consider briefly also that global institutions with policy interests and 
influence have become increasingly active in the other cases of externalities described above 
(Section II). The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), for 
example, offers a global institution with expanding policy-related activities. Without a multi-
scale policy foundation that ranges from the local institutions and farmers’ field-level logic of the 
spatial externalities under heterogeneous production conditions to the level of the global benefits 
of agrobiodiverse maize production, the policy is likely to be ill-formed. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article aims to shed light on the challenge of identifying spatial externalities in 
agriculture, and the implications of such identification for both development and environmental 
policy.  In particular, a key objective is to setup a conceptual foundation for quantifying spatial 
externalities within agriculture.  Since parcel-level net returns to alternative land uses are often 
not observable by researchers, the increasing availability of spatial land-use data can be used as a 
means of quantifying such externalities.  The primary challenge with such an exercise is that   34
landscape patterns arising from positive or negative spatial externalities can be observationally 
equivalent.  Therefore, a simple quantification of the presence of spatial externalities through 
standard statistical methods is not sufficient to identify whether such externalities are positive or 
negative.  This point is critical because the ultimate design of welfare-enhancing landscape 
policies crucially depends on whether externalities are positive or negative.  For example, a 
negative externality associated with a specific land use choice suggests a policy to discourage 
that choice, while a positive externality suggests a policy to encourage the choice.  However, an 
important message of this paper is that the underlying identification problems associated with 
documenting spatial externalities from spatial land-use data can be solved by careful empirical 
design with a structural foundation and a multi-method approach. 
In the presence of significant transactions costs or provision of global public goods, 
spatial externalities may provide a rationale for policy interventions at a variety of spatial scales 
and from a variety of institutions.  While the ultimate role for policy depends on the specific 
land-use context, empirical identification of spatial externalities can highlight areas where the 
social value of land can be enhanced by policy. In addition, the presence of spatial externalities 
suggests that policy-induced land-use changes—whether from a policy specifically aimed at the 
externality, or a policy aimed at another outcome—can cascade to other parcels on the landscape, 
thereby creating potentially unintended consequences for both development and environmental 
outcomes.  An understanding of the presence and source of spatial externalities can help avoid 
unintended consequences and improve the efficiency of policy making.   
The goal of our paper is to open up and provide a conceptual foundation to a thematic 
area located within the general topic of spatial dynamics of land-use change.  Our approach is 
similar to and related, yet also distinct, with respect to the current approaches that are associated   35
with models of Land Use/Cover Change (LUCC).  In summary one of our main contributions is 
to provide a spatially explicit micro-economic rationale and methodological approach, along 
with suggestions for research design, to complement and provide research strategies for better 
understanding the components of land-use change and the consequences for both development 
and environmental policies.   36





Figure 2 – Location of Organic Farms in a Conventional Landscape 
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Table 2: Identification of Spatial Externalities from Land-Use Data 
Information  Baseline Condition  Landscape(s) which allow 
identification of externalities 
Partial Information 
22
BA R R − >0  Clustered (A, A) 
 
22
BA R R − <0  Clustered (B, B) 
No Returns Information  NA  Clustered (A, A)↔Fragmented (A, B); 
Clustered (B, B)↔Fragmented (B, A) 
Complete Information 
22
BA R R − <>0  any landscape 
   38
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Example applications include: Swinton, 2002; Case, 1992; Holloway et al., 2002; Roe et al., 
2002; and Belcher et al. 2005. 
2 Swallow and Wear (1993) examine the externalities from one timber-producing forest stand on 
an adjacent stand where wildlife production is a management goal.  Albers (1996) examines the 
interplay between irreversible land-uses and spatial interactions with a focus on the social 
benefits of land preservation.  
3 Unobserved landscape attributes end up in the error term of the econometric model and are 
typically correlated over space, providing multiple estimation challenges (Anselin 2002). 
4 Econometric estimation of spatial interaction parameters generally yields information regarding 
the average – or deviations from the average – interaction effect as opposed to each specific 
interaction between all adjacent parcels.  Estimation of individual interaction effects would 
require parcel-specific returns data over time. 
5 The literature we surveyed in making this assessment of the LUCC approach included: 
Geoghegan et al., 2001; Lambin, Geist, et al., 2001; Lambin, Turner, et al., 2001; Lewis and 
Plantinga 2007; Mertens et al., 2000; Moran and Ostrom, 2005; Rindfuss et al., 2004; Vance and 
Geoghegan, 2002; Veldkamp and Lambin, 2001; Turner et al., 2001; and Walker, 2003. 
6 It’s relatively simple to extend the model to two-directional spatial externalities, but a simple 
model of one-directional externalities provides the clearest results and is relevant to many 
agricultural scenarios. 
7 Heterogeneity in land quality can be driven by a variety of factors, such as wealth endowments, 
managerial skills, or other social characteristics of landowners.   39
                                                                                                                                                             
8 An alternative setup with very similar implications would be to simply assume that externalities 
flow from one land use (e.g. use A) rather than from one parcel. 
9 If there are no negative spatial externalities, then
,
22
BA B R R = , which implies that
,
22




AA A B A R RRR −>−.  If there are no positive spatial externalities, then
,
22




AB A R R >  and
,
2222
BABB A R RRR −<− . 




BAA AA R RR R −> −, or
,
22 22
BABB A R RRR −>− , or both.  Fragmented 
(A, B) configuration is also consistent with no spatial externalities. 
11 While the optimal quantity of a particular land-use is beyond the scope of this paper, we note 
that the empirical identification of spatial externalities is necessary for understanding both the 
optimal pattern and the optimal quantity of alternative land uses. 
12 Proof: For the tax to induce landowner 1 to switch to use B, then
,
12 2 1 ()




BB AA R R − > 11
AB R R −  by definition, then 22
BA R R − > 11




BA AA A R RR <= , then
,
12 2 1 ()
AB B AB R RR R −− < . 
13 If  22 ()
BA cR R =< − , the policy has distributional (efficiency) consequences. 
14 One can imagine local cooperation among farmers or institutional innovation (via a 
cooperative) that might obviate completely the need for any explicit policy intervention. These 
“win-win” scenarios would resemble the Coasian solution.  
15 Examples include CONDESAN (Consortium for Development and Sustainable Agriculture in 
the Andes), which is based in Lima, Peru, and the Latin American land use program within 
CIAT (International Center for Tropical Agriculture), which is based in Cali, Colombia.   40
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